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Abstract
 The primary objective of this study is to 
explore the various ways that Internet 
advertising provider (IAP) can charge firms to 
advertise.  There are two pricing strategies that 
can be adopted. The first is called uniform 
pricing: Firms pay a fixed fee, depending on the 
size and location of the advertisement. The 
second strategy is known as two-part tariff: 
Firms pay a fixed charge and an additional 
per-click fee. IAPs may adopt one or both of 
these pricing strategies. Our model hypothesizes 
that there are two IAPs offering advertising 
space. The modeling shows that in cases where a 
uniform pricing strategy is adopted, the fee that 
each IAP can attain is monotonically decreasing 
over their substitutability.  That is, IAPs that 
wish to maximize their revenue have to take 
measures to distinguish themselves from the 
competition in order to achieve zero 
substitutability. In cases where a two-part tariff 
pricing strategy is adopted, the revenue curve 
becomes convex.  In other words, IAPs may 
choose to have either full substitutability or zero 
substitutability in order to maximize their 
profits. 
1. Introduction  
The ever-increasing expansion of the 
Internet has led to the dominance of Internet 
companies such as Amazon and Yahoo!. These 
companies offer not only their own services but 
also advertising space to firms wishing to 
promote their products or brands.  Hereafter, 
these companies are referred as Internet 
Advertising Providers (IAPs). Visitors to these 
sites can access their services and also find 
themselves directed to other sites by simply 
clicking on banners on the Internet pages.  For 
the surfer, these banners are no more than just 
icons offering access to other websites.  
However, for IAPs that go to great expense to 
construct and maintain these websites, these 
banners may be the only source of revenue.  In 
other words, double clicking on those banners 
has becoming a new medium in advertising.  
This has led to the creation of a new advertising 
industry called Internet marketing. 
In terms of the significance of Internet 
marketing, although its popularity began only a 
few years ago, its potential is tremendous.  In 
the US for example, the revenue from Internet 
advertising amounted to $2 billion in 1998, 
according to a report by the Internet Advertising 
Bureau (IAB, 2000).  The same report also 
estimates this may have exceeded $4 billion in 
1999.  In Japan, the revenue from Internet 
advertising is estimated at ¥11.4 billion in 1998.  
In Taiwan, the Internet advertising revenue is 
estimated at NT$100 million (Yeh, 2000).  
Compared to the annual advertising budget of 
NT$80 billion in Taiwan, this is only a fairly 
small portion.  Nevertheless, with a growth rate 
that has doubled annually in the past few years, 
this clearly should not be ignored. 
Internet marketing is not only significant 
in this practical way but is also important in 
academic terms, with research into areas such as 
pricing and competition.  Generally, IAPs may 
collect revenue from two sources: Advertisement 
Impression (AI) and Click Through Rate (CTR).  
AI represents an advertisement delivered 
successfully to a qualified visitor. A qualified 
visitor is one who has the opportunity to view 
the advertisement.  Therefore, this does not 
include cases where sites bearing the 
advertisement are simply listed as results of a 
search. Clearly, visits to those sites by internal 
users are also excluded. CTR represents the 
number of times visitors click on an 
advertisement banner and are then directed to the 
target site.  For payment purposes, firms that 
wish to have a banner on an IAP’s web page are 
usually asked to pay a lump sum fee.  Hereafter 
this lump sum fee is referred to as the AI fee. If a 
visitor clicks on their banner and is successfully 
directed to the target site, the provider may then 
collect a running payment according to the 
number of clicks each banner receives. Hereafter, 
this running payment is referred as the referral 
fee. (In some cases, however, the provider may 
choose not to charge unless this results in a 
business for the target site.) An interesting 
question is how the provider can set those fees. 
Do pricing strategies exist that can help 
providers maximize their revenue? 
1.1. Internet vs. traditional advertising
media 
We begin our investigation of those 
questions by comparing the practice of Internet 
advertising with other traditional forms of 
  
advertising media, such as magazine, TV and 
radio.  It has always been a challenge in 
measuring the effectiveness of advertising with 
traditional media. This may be due to the lack of 
accurate ways to assess the link between 
traditional advertising and consumer purchasing 
behavior. Therefore, traditional media can only 
charge clients according to impression numbers. 
However, one significant difference we can see 
in Internet advertising is that CTR tracing 
technology provides a much better estimate of 
the power of advertisements. The server proxy 
offers a detail recording on Internet visitors’ 
clicking actions. Furthermore, if firms can agree 
to inform providers when visitors make a 
purchase, then the effectiveness of 
advertisements can be measured with the utmost 
accuracy.  In this case, firms can pay a referral 
fee only for “successful” advertising. 
1.2. Non-linear pricing  
Since the missing link in measuring the 
advertising effectiveness between advertising 
and purchase in traditional advertising media can 
be recovered with the CTR technology via 
Internet, the next question is what pricing 
strategy (uniform pricing or two-part tariff) will 
the IAPs employ to maximize their profit. Is 
two-part tariff a superior pricing strategy to 
uniform pricing, which is widely adopted in the 
area of traditional advertising media? Among the 
several tariff schemes in nonlinear pricing 
strategy, two-part tariff is the most widely used 
pricing strategy. Firms pay a fixed charge and an 
additional per-click fee. From the provider’s 
viewpoint, the fixed fee is less attractive to firms 
but results in higher overall revenue (Wilson, 
1992).  Nahata, et al. (1999) show that “…, a 
fixed investment that …reduces future 
transaction cost, a two-part tariff [or multi-part 
tariff]… becomes more profitable (than uniform 
price).”  Compared with the huge investment 
involved in website development, the cost of 
putting a banner on a web page is negligible.  
In other words, the nature of Internet advertising 
may favor the two-part (or maybe multi-part) 
tariff system. 
Since the introduction of the Internet, an 
impression has been created that the cost of 
doing things through the net is negligible.  For 
example, to the providers the cost of placing 
advertisement banners on web pages is 
negligible.  However, the space on a web page 
is limited and quite often for the same page there 
will be only one type of firm able to advertise.  
Consequently, firms may have to compete for 
the space, which drives the price up.  Another 
difficulty is that when the impression rate or the 
CTR is high, this may use up the bandwidth and 
slow down the transmission speed. This can 
cause visitors to lose patience.  In this regards, 
providers do indeed have a variable (opportunity) 
cost.  This gives a reference for us to model the 
marginal cost in the following sections. 
Given that, however, in the Internet’s very 
short history we have observed quite a few cases 
that uniform pricing (or sometimes referred to as 
“buffet pricing” in Nahata, et al. (1999)) is more 
viable than the two-part tariff.  A significant 
example is the case of America Online.  
America Online is an Internet service provider 
(ISP).  It was the first significant ISP to provide 
a flat rate for users to connect with the Internet.  
Other ISPs were then forced to provide a flat rate 
(uniform pricing) strategy to stay in the market. 
In Taiwan uniform pricing was implemented on 
the wide band system put on market in 1999. To 
some extent, this study explains the pricing 
behavior above. 
 The next section shows model without the 
referral fee, which follows the uniform pricing 
strategy. Section 3 shows the model that allows 
the use of referral fee, which follows the 
two-part tariff strategy. Related issues and future 
studies are addressed in Section 4. 
2. Model without referral fee 
For nonlinear pricing strategy, such as the 
two-part tariff, to be successful firms must be 
heterogeneous and providers must have 
monopolistic market power (Wilson, 1992; Oi, 
1971).  However, in practice very similar 
oligopolistic competitors may compete using the 
two-part tariff strategy.  For example, China 
Times and United Daily News both provide web 
pages for advertisements, and they both price 
their banners on a two-part tariff basis.  Hence, 
for simplicity, we will setup our model by 
assuming that the IAPs compete in duopoly and 
firms are assumed to be either light users or 
heavy users.1 
Moving onto the modeling in a fashion of 
two-part tariff, it is necessary to set the demand 
profile of the buyers by assuming they are 
homogenous (Nahata, et al., 1999).  Although 
the homogenous assumption seems unrealistic, 
the simplified situation may help to clarify this 
complexity.  Furthermore, it may help to justify 
the results derived from the heterogeneous 
                                                 
1 If providers have information in regard to the light and 
heavy usage, they may charge different fixed fees with 
respect the two types of firms.  The fixed fees reflect the 
consumer surpluses of the firms.  However, in most cases, 
the provider does not have this information.  As a result, the 
provider may charge a fixed fee according to the surplus that 
the light users have, and set a per-unit price equal to the 
marginal cost for both types users. 
  
assumption. 
Next, according to Wilson (1992), if the 
following four preconditions are satisfied, sellers 
may adopt a nonlinear pricing strategy, such as 
two-part tariff.  The four preconditions are as 
follows (Wilson, 1992, p.10)： 
• The seller has a monopoly of power. 
• Resale markets are limited or absent. 
• The seller can monitor customers’ 
purchases. 
• The seller has disaggregated demand data. 
Although in the Internet industry, IAPs are 
far from monopolistic in their areas, as long as 
the competition is imperfect the first 
precondition is not completely violated.  Resale 
is also unlikely in the Internet advertising market, 
because the advertisements have to be placed 
directly with the provider.  The firm is thus 
unlikely to resell its advertising space to a third 
party without releasing the resale information to 
the provider.  As mentioned above, existing 
information technology can allow the provider to 
record the CTR precisely.2 That is, the third 
precondition can at least be partially satisfied.  
The last precondition is assumed in the present 
study. Therefore, a nonlinear pricing strategy is 
justified for our modeling of Internet advertising 
as follows. 
Consider that there are two Internet 
advertisement providers (IAPs), say 
2,1, =iM i . These two providers offer web 
pages for firms that need to place advertisements 
to promote their brand or increase sales.  The 
two providers may compete with each other on 
price ( 2,1, =ipi ). The price of an 
advertisement may depend on the web pages 
( 2,1, =iqi ) that are available. There may exist 
certain substitutability between web pages on the 
two providers’ websites.  Set θ  the 
substitutability and assume the demands for the 
two as  
( )2111 qqbap θ+−= , and 
( )1222 qqbap θ+−= . 
Assume the manufacturing costs are 
2,1, =ici .  Then the profits for each provider 
are 
iiiii qcqp −=π , where 2,1=i . 
This model is no different to that used for 
traditional advertising media. Hence we call it 
                                                 
2 Further agreements between the firm and the 
provider would be needed to share information 
regarding final purchases if one would like to 
have a perfect measure of the link in advertising 
effectiveness mentioned earlier. 
the benchmark model.  Later we will use this 
benchmark to demonstrate the differences 
between traditional advertising media and 
Internet advertising. 
The solutions to the benchmark model are 
( ) ( )11111 2 cpq bN −= −θ , and 
( ) ( )22112 2 cpq bN −= −θ , where the N  stands 
for the Nash equilibrium. 
In Appendix 1, we calculate the Nash 
prices as follows. 
( ) ( )( )212124 11 222 ccaap N θθθθ ++−−= − . 
( ) ( )( )121224 12 222 ccaap N θθθθ ++−−= − .. 
In addition to those results, we are 
particularly interested in profit changes over the 
choice of the level of substitutability (θ ). This 
derivative in the next equation is derived in 
Appendix 2. ( )
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Set 01 =
∂
∂
θ
π
, and we then have 
( ) ( ) 0
1
11
112 =∂
−∂
+−
− θθ
θ CPCP
N
N . 
Assume 0<− BAp , that is 
( ) 01 <
∂
−∂
θ
CPN
, then 
( ) ( ) 0
1
11
112 =∂
−∂
+−
− θθ
θ CPCP
N
N
. 
Reorganize the equation,  ( )
( )11
11
21 CP
d
CPd
N
N
−
−
=
−
−
⇒
θ
θ
θ
. 
To solve the equation, let 
( )11 CPx N −= and ( )θ∂
−∂
=′
11 CPx
N
, and 
we then have 
( ) 01 2 =⋅+⋅− x
d
dx θ
θ
θ . 
Through the reorganization of this 
  
equation, we have 
02 =−−
θ
θθ
θ d
dxx
d
dx
. 
The solutions to the above equation are as 
follows. 
1
2
4 22*
1 >
′
′++
=
x
xxxθ , or 
  0
2
4 
22
*
2 <
′
′+−
=
x
xxxθ . 
Figure 1 shows a plot of 
θ
π
∂
∂ 1  over θ . 
This graph could be reversed into π  over θ  
as shown in the graph below. Since the θ  only 
makes sense between zero and one, according to 
the graph above, the provider’s profit is 
maximized if θ  is minimized.  This result 
implies that if a referral fee does not exist 
between the provider and the advertiser, it is 
better for the provider to fully distinguish its 
market position from that of its competitors.  
Nevertheless, it might be interesting to study 
further the case in which one provider is the 
anchor and other providers move closer to its 
market position. 
3. Model with referral fee 
The next model is set to consider the way 
in which referral fee can be collected via the 
application of CTR technology.  Typically, the 
provider may collect a one-off advertising fee at 
the outset. In addition, the provider may collect a 
referral fee for each visitor that clicks on the 
advertiser’s banner and is directed to the 
advertiser’s website. 
In addition to the assumptions and 
notations we made in the benchmark model, we 
add the referral fee to our model as follows.  
[ ]
[ ] )2(      
)1(       
1222
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qqbaP
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θ
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｝ Macleod 
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2,1, =iri  represent the referral fee per 
click and 2,1, =iki  represent the number of 
clicks. 
By reorganizing the equations (1) and (2), 
we have 
⇒  
      
( )[ ]
( )[ ]211222
122121
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Also, by substituting these equations into 
equations (3) and (4), we derive the profit 
functions as follows. 
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By setting 0
1
1
=
∂
∂
P
π
, we derive the Nash 
equilibria as follows. 
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Substitute the two equilibria into equations 
(1) and (2), and we get 
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The Nash price equilibria are then arrived at as 
follows. ( )
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As in the benchmark model, we are 
interested in the profit change over the 
substitutability.  That is, 
  
( )( ) ( )
     
1
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Let ( )11 CPx −= , xkrbB ′′= 11  , 
1
1
1 dP
drr =′ , and ( )
θd
CPdx 11 −=′ . Note that, if 
01 <′r  and  0<′x  then it is also true 
that 0>B .  The intuition for 01 <′r  is that 
the referral fee is compensatory to the 
advertising charge.  If the provider charges the 
advertiser a high price for placing an 
advertisement on its website, the provider may 
have to reduce the referral fee as an enticement.  
The intuition for  0<′x  is that the price the 
provider can charge increases proportionate to 
the reduction in substitutability.  
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Set 01 =
∂
∂
θ
π
, we have 
( ) 02222 224 =−′++′−+− BxxxxxBB θθθ
. 
Since 10 <<θ , the solutions to the 
complicated situation above may be bounded 
between two extremes: 
( )
02
222 224 
=−′+
+′−+−
Bxx
xxxBB θθ
 and  
 
( ) 0222 24 =−′+′−+− BxxxxBB θθ . 
 
Let Y  denote 
( ) BxxxxBB −′+′−+− 222 24 θθ . 
Thus the two extremes above are equivalent to 
02 2 =+ xY  and 0=Y .  The former case 
gives  
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Figure 1 (see below) shows the three cases: 
02 2 =+ xY , 02 2 =+ θxY  and 0=Y . 
It reveals the interesting finding that there exists 
a unique point where the provider’s profit is 
minimized.  A move in substitutability away 
from this point toward either zero or one 
increases profitability. 
4. Discussions 
The primary objective of this study is to 
explore the non-linear pricing strategy that 
Internet advertising provider (IAP) can charge 
firms to advertise. A simple model is build to 
take into account IAP’s strategic behavior and 
firm’s advertising demands.   The strategy of 
uniform pricing is modeled, which is used as a 
benchmark. This benchmark is then compared to 
a model built with the consideration of the 
strategy of two-part tariff. The modeling shows 
that in cases where a uniform pricing strategy is 
adopted, the fee that each IAP can attain is 
monotonic decreasing over their substitutability 
in market.  That is, IAPs that wish to maximize 
their revenue have to take measures to 
distinguish themselves from the competition in 
order to achieve zero substitutability. In cases 
where a two-part tariff pricing strategy is 
adopted, the revenue curve becomes convex.  
In other words, IAPs may choose to have either 
full substitutability or zero substitutability in 
order to maximize their profits. 
Our theoretical propositions can also be 
further examined with field data.  At present, 
only a few providers, such as China Times, post 
their pricing schedules on their websites in 
Taiwan.  To conduct an empirical study of 
pricing strategies it is necessary to ask providers 
directly for information on their pricing 
schedules.  If this survey were undertaken, we 
would expect to find that providers use both 
uniform pricing and two-part tariff strategies.  
If further information from those providers were 
also available, then we would be able to perform 
econometric analysis on the data.  This analysis 
could be helpful to understand the factors behind 
the choice between the two pricing strategies. It 
could also help to measure the relative impact of 
each factor. 
Although for Internet advertising existing 
information technology can precisely record the 
advertisement impression and click through rate, 
opportunistic behavior may remain.  On the one 
hand, the provider may not keep the web site 
sufficiently attractive to achieve the promised hit 
rate.  On the other hand, the firm’s service may 
disappoint the click through customers and 
therefore result in a decreasing click through rate.  
In other words, it takes effort from both sides to 
ensure success. Where a referral fee is involved, 
matters can become more complicated. It is not 
in the firm’s interest to inform the provider when 
a purchase is made.3 Without this information it 
                                                 
3 Sometimes, contract may be designed to allow 
the collection of referral fee. For example, a 
  
is not possible to collect the referral fee. This 
may be one reason why the referral fee system is 
rarely employed. However, if there is technology 
that can tell if a purchase is made, then the 
referral fee system is actually superior to the 
click through rate from the viewpoint of 
performance-based pricing. 
Perhaps the most significant case for using 
the two-part tariff strategy is in the area of 
franchising. According to the literature on 
franchise, the widely employed payment strategy 
between franchiser and franchisee includes the 
franchise fee (a fixed fee) and running royalty 
(per unit charge).  This reflects an important 
consideration that the running royalty provides 
incentives for the franchisee to work diligently 
without close monitoring by the franchiser 
(Bhattacharyya and Lafontaine, 1992; Lal, 1990).  
In addition, this payment strategy can encourage 
franchisers to do their best to promote their 
trademark and products to increase franchisees’ 
sales volume.  For all these reasons, this may 
be why the two-part tariff is widely adopted in 
franchising.  Nevertheless, the popularity of the 
uniform pricing strategy by ISPs provides a good 
reason for us to investigate this strategy in future 
study. 
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Appendix 1 
The price-reaction functions are as 
follows. 
                                                                   
business is attained within IAP’s websites.  
This design enables the IAP a perfectly 
monitoring whether or not a business is attained. 
Nevertheless, it will become a contractual 
problem, which is not a consideration of the 
present study. 
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Appendix 2 
Following our definitions and the 
results in Appendix 1, we have the 
following in profit, Nash price and Nash 
quantity. 
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Firstly, the derivative of the price to 
the substitutability is 
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and the derivative of the quantity to the 
substitutability is 
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The two jointly deliver the profit to 
substitutability derivative as follow. 
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